Limonov vs. Putin Page 20
As you can see from these sources, the FSB and the Prosecutor General have taken an unlawful, prejudiced stance towards the NBP from the start; they tried to force the liquidation of a political party, using the administrative resource. The Prosecutor General and the justice ministry did everything the FSB ordered them. However the district court did not rule in favor of the FSB then. The suit of Moscow’s department of the justice ministry was declined by the district court. And the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of Moscow’s district court back in 2001.
I will not linger on all the episodes and vicissitudes of the attempts of Moscow’s Prosecutor General and Moscow’s department of the justice ministry to execute the demand of the FSB and liquidate the NBP. I will only note that the decision about the liquidation of the NBP, taken on 06.29.05. by Moscow’s district court was made under the enormous pressure of the same forces that initiated the first attempts of the NBP liquidation back in July 2001. These forces, namely the FSB and the Prosecutor General are not popular among our people today and are justly considered to be the instruments of political violence against differently thinking individuals and parties. The Supreme Court took a just decision on August 16th 2005 and the RF judicial corporation can be proud of it. It has ceased the abuse.
2. Presently there are 35 thousand members in the NBP. Thus, the deputy Prosecutor General Zvyagintzev demands to take away the right to create and participate in a public association from 35 thousand people, i.e. he demands to the Supreme Court to violate the Constitution.
3. Zvyagintzev points out in his handing-in: ‘After the organization stops its activities it must remove the violations of the legislation. The NBP did not do that.’ As the NBP chairman I declare that we fulfilled all the demands, in particular we changed the name of our organization, excluding the word ‘party’ from it and we also changed our legal address; we excluded the right to advance deputies from our Code. Three times we made attempts to register the changes in documents. These changes were not registered by Moscow’s department of the justice ministry, as demonstrated by the written refusals on 09.16.03, 07.14.04. and 07.07.05. These decisions were made on such insignificant grounds that there could be no other conclusion than to ascertain: Moscow’s department of the justice ministry refuses to register the changes made by the NBP on purpose. By the hands of the Prosecutor General Zvyagintzev is trying to make the Supreme Court join the political violence, the repressions that are constantly used against the NBP.
4. The Russian society has noticed the excessive cruelty of the power (because the FSB, the Prosecutor General and the justice ministry are all instruments of the power) towards the NBP members. I will cite here the testimony of the Izvestia newspaper on December 3rd of this year. The ‘editor’s opinion’ is stated in the following words: ‘For those who follow the trials of the Limonovists, nothing surprising happened. The Russian legal machine has been grinding the lives of this youth organization’s members with a special cruelty since a long time.’ And further: ‘Someone doesn’t like the Limonovists very much. Someone wants them to receive the maximum punishment.’ And also: ‘It’s been a long time that the power is excessively harsh towards the Limonovists. Only now everybody has noticed this.’ I ask you to note that this is not the opinion of a single journalist, but a whole journalistic collectivity. This is also how the society of the Russian Federation thinks.
5. Let’s call a spade a spade, casting aside the euphemism ‘liquidation’. We have a disgusting result: the ban on a political organization is being forced. This ban, if the Surpeme Court will support it will expose Russia and present it as a country of State repressions against differently thinking political parties. Doubtlessly this ban will make a bad impression on Russia and other countries’ public. And such a decision, if the Supreme Court decides to initiate it and, God forbid, support the prosecutor General in its striving to liquidate the NBP, will damage the reputation of Russia’s legal corporation in general and the reputation of the Supreme Court in particular. I have studied both the Roman law and Napoleon’s Code; I respect the notion of ‘Law’. This is a high and honorable notion, the best in humanity’s organization; this is a Law that limits brutality and bestial instincts. I would have liked that the Russian courts and in particular the Supreme Court were a mighty and self-sufficient corporation. The people believe that the Prosecutor General is not self-sufficient today. I beg you not to yield to the pressure of the Prosecutor General.
6. The decision about the liquidation of the NBP will lead to unpredictable consequences. It will force it to go underground. On party conferences that were just held in July and September the secretaries of the executive committees of the NBP regional organizations have unanimously spoke in favor of continuing the activities of the National-Bolshevik Party even after the decision to liquidate it.
Now, in short, my arguments.
I ASK
To refuse the demand of the Prosecutor General about the cancellation of the Supreme Court’s decision of 08.16.05. and not to appeal the decision. I ask you, honorable Supreme judges, to take a just decision. History is looking at you in these moments.
Truly yours. E. V. Savenko (Limonov). October 5th 2005, Moscow.’
‘After me, the floor was given to Alexander Averin. Alexander confirmed our desire that the decision of the SC of August 16th remain in force; it is a just decision. After Averin the floor was given to a woman from the Department of Justice. Followed a lie, bleak as the woman herself. The chairman Lebedev declared a break. …
About an hour later we were invited. The journalists were also invited to enter. Lebedev read out a short decision. As it was to be expected, the presidium of the Supreme Court took the decision that the Prosecutor General demanded: return the case in appeal. History, really watching these Supreme judges has cursed above in the sky, I think. She found the cowardly old men in gowns disgusting…”
In conclusion we clearly see how the history of the NBP’s defeat (and the refusals to grant it the status of an all-Russian party, on the details of which I did not linger) illustrates the repressive behavior of all the “legal” institutions of the State. The justice ministry, the Prosecutor General and the Supreme Court. They all behave dishonestly and violate the laws by the hand of the law.
On its knees, the justice ministry serves Putin’s group. All decisions are taken dependently from the party’s affiliation to the Kremlin. For those parties that seem to be affiliated or made by the president’s administration no registration problems ever appear. Their documents are not examined; possibly they are not even leafed through. Nobody verifies their fake lists. Thus, there exists a Popular Party of Gudkov and Raykov; it has already taken part in some federal elections. It was registered as a party with 120 thousand members. At the same time it is known that the Popular Party does not hold mass meetings and marches, it is practically absent from the regions. I.e. it is a fake organization. But the justice ministry will not put in doubt the Popular Party because it is affiliated to the Kremlin. If it stops to be affiliated, an order will be given from above and it will be removed. There are several dozens of such parties, existing on paper, without a membership, in the registry of the Federal registration service.
The central electoral commission has fulfilled the functions of a filtration center even under Yeltsin. It was destroying undesirable parties and blocks, which managed to break through the filtration system of the justice ministry. I have watched the CEC in action; how it has dashingly dealt with undesirable presidential candidates before the 1996 elections. The methodic was simple: the CEC declared over 15% of the signatures collected for the advancement of a candidate invalid. Thus, Galina Starovoytova as well as other candidates who aspired to participate in the elections was knocked out before my eyes. The CEC was extremely malicious; those candidates who could have taken votes away from Yeltsin’s principal opponent Gennady Zyuganov were willingly registered and their signatures were not rejected.
In the last years the Central e
lectoral committee and its head, the frantic Veshnyakov, started to formulate and advance limiting laws directed at the destruction of both politics and the principle of competition in politics through the State Duma. The last masterpieces of the CEC’s police art are the laws banning the creation of electoral party blocks, the law about the transfer to an exclusively proportional electoral system and the introduction of a 7% barrier to get into the State Duma. The CEC also serves Putin’s group on its knees. And Veshnyakov keeps inspiringly lying in raptures. This is why National-Bolsheviks have abundantly poured mayonnaise over him in August 2003, when he was presiding over a vile forum. At least he was punished in that way, this man who has many liberties taken away from Russia’s citizens on his conscience.
In Yeltsin’s RF the political field was controlled; however the concept of “affiliation” was interpreted more broadly under Yeltsin. Affiliated were Yabloko, SPS and smaller political organizations. And the Kremlin did not yet have the desire to tighten the circle of “affiliated” and have a complete control over politics. However when the new boss, VVP, came into the Kremlin he decided to have a total control over politics. The measures undertaken for this were increasingly squeezing the politics rabbit, crushing its bones. It was December 2003 when SPS and Yabloko were squeezed out of the State Duma. And in December 2004 the boa of the police State has completely swallowed the politics rabbit.
In my speech before the Supreme Court I have mentioned that the citizens consider that the Prosecutor General is not self-sufficient. I have just received a Romir Monitoring survey of 1600 people from a hundred cities and towns in the RF. Only 6% of the surveyed believe the honesty of the Prosecutor General, a little more trust the Supreme Court – 10%. Only 5% of Russians consider the government honest. And only 3% consider the Federation Council honest, while only 2% – the State Duma. What concerns the president, 30% of the surveyed still consider him honest. This book has for its aim to diminish the quantity of such idiots.
On November 15th 2005 the Supreme Court obediently confirmed the decision of Moscow’s district court about the “liquidation” of the NBP. The National-Bolshevik Party is banned.
HOW NTV AND OTHER FREE MASS MEDIA WERE KILLED
(THE STRANGLING OF THE FREE MASS MEDIA)
1. How NTV was taken away
This is how my comrades Decembrists who came to the reception room of the president’s administration have formulated Putin’s accusation of strangling freedom of press: “The closing down of independent TV channels. Thanks to you the television ceased to show the truth and is daily lying to the people.” After they have come to power on the elections of March 26th 2004 Putin and his group have began to clean up the media space. Opposition mass media belonging to the oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky suffered the first repressions. There were precise reasons for this: Gusinsky (and his media) have openly taken the side of the movement Fatherland – All Russia of Yuri Luzhkov and Evgeny Primakov on the 1999 parliamentary elections. Also Gusinsky’s structures have kept sympathies to Grigory Yavlinsky’s Yabloko, but they were less supportive of it. In relation to the refusal of Yuri Luzhkov and Evgeny Primakov to participate in the presidential elections, in the beginning of February 2000 Gusinsky and the management of the Most Company declared their decision (a fatal one, as it turned out later) not to support Vladimir Putin on the presidential elections of March 26th 2000.
Before we go to the defeat of Gusinsky’s media by the president and his people, let us make a short review of these media. First of all, there is of course the NTV television company. In spring 2003 Igor Malashenko, former general director of Ostankino, former editor-in-chief of Ostankino Oleg Dobrodeyev and author of the Itogi program Evgeny Kisilev approached him with the demand to support the creation of NTV, a new independent television company. On July 12th 1993 NTV was registered. According to Yeltsin’s orders, on December 22nd 1993 NTV was granted the right to start broadcasting on the Fourth channel and from November 11th 1996 – the right to a 24-hours use of the Fourth channel. On January 25th 1998 NTV was given the status of an all-Russian television company. In February 1993 the Segodnya newspaper was established with the active participation of Gusinsky. In the end of January 1997 Gusinsky declared about the official registration of the Media-Most media holding. The holding consisted of: shares of NTV and NTV-Plus (created in July 1996), Echo of Moscow radio station and the Sem Dney publishing house, publishing the journals Itogi (created in 1996), the newspapers Segodnya and Sem Dney. Subsequently, from august 1999 the new satellite radio station Sport-FM was added to the holding. In reality all sorts of small units were also part of Gusinsky’s holding, but the general reader does not need these details; let us skip them.
The NTV turned out modern and new although obviously it bore the owner’s stamp. In June 1999 Gusinsky’s television merits were marked by the Teffi award – for his personal contribution to the development of television.
Until his forced leave outside the country Gusinsky’s political sympathies invariably laid on the side of Moscow’s mayor Yuri Luzhkov and his structures supported the movement Fatherland – All Russia on the 1999 elections. Gusinsky made the acquaintance of Luzhkov and his wife, Elena Baturina, back in 1987 when he was starting his businessman career.
By creating the Media-Most holding in 1997 Gusinky practically turned out to be the first Russia’s “media-magnate”, someone like Rupert Murdok or Ted Turner on Russia’s scale. He considered the mass media as a source of revenues. Here it should be mentioned that the mass media created for profits doubtlessly tend to give the viewer, listener or reader all the true, all the sensational, all the secrete information, while the mass media that serve as instruments of propaganda in someone’s favor will always distort, cut, hide information in their favor. Mass media can be politically engaged, why not, but in this case there has to be enough of them and they have to belong to different political forces. The citizen will have the total possible set of various points of view and switching channels on his television he will be able to receive the complete information. Like the National-Bolsheviks Decembrists have justly pointed out, now, Putin’s group has usurped all the information – it has taken over all the largest TV channels and thus daily presents only one kind of information to the viewer – the one it wants. And thus it forms the worldview of most of the country’s population, tells them how to understand. People weak of will and feeble of mind are satisfied with the official version of reality. Those who are stronger look for information like in dissidents’ times: in Radio Liberty or BBC for example. This is informational violence; it is in fact a crime of Putin’s group. But let us return to Gusinsky.
Here Gusinsky interests us not so much as an oligarch, but as a media-magnate. He has discovered that exclusively non-engaged mass media can be commercially lucrative (and not needing financing from interested structures). This is the role aspired by the mass media of Gusinsky’s holding. Nevertheless, Gusinsky was not spared by the total inclusion of the economical elite into the political whirlwind and has introduced serious corrections into his position. In other words he did not manage to stay unengaged and his principal creation – NTV – did not stay unengaged. Television is a serious political weapon; a Siegfried’s sword of sorts and the temptation to use it was great. By putting NTV and himself in opposition to Putin Gusinsky has signed his death warrant. Actually, it should be noticed in Gusinsky’s justification that Putin and his group would have taken the channel from him anyway because they govern the country from the position of absolutism and just physically do not tolerate the presence of such a powerful weapon as a TV channel in someone else’s hands.
Gusinsky has drawn many fresh talents into NTV. His producer’s education came at hand here. They say that Gusinsky did not like to personally meddle with politics until 1999. They affirm that it was Igor Malashenko, NTV’s general director, who has enthralled him with political projects. (Although back in January 1996 Gusinsky joined a coalition of bankers created by Boris Berezovsky in Dav
os to support Boris Yeltsin in the presidential elections).
The first attack on Gusinsky was made back in 1994. Employees of the main department of the president’s security attacked the Most-Bank office in the city hall, without presenting any charges. It was Korzhakov who gave the order. This attack is interpreted differently but most probably it was the first sign of resentment of the people in should-straps. In the end today we see even sharper oppositions of the same forces: people in should-straps have put Khodorkovsky in prison. At the time Gusinsky went to London for six months. Repressions did not follow and soon Yeltsin dismissed Korzhakov. Actually, now we are interested by the freedom of the mass media and the access of the citizen to total information about what happens in this country and in the world and not about the war between bankers and officers.