Limonov vs. Putin Read online

  – From us, because we wanted to release Nikolay and understood what they wanted from us.

  – Once they showed on television that you have met with Sergey Ivanov. Everybody thought that it was to discuss about some Georgian problems.

  – No, it was when we talked about Glushkov. But everybody though it was about military bases in Georgia.

  – How many times did you meet?

  – Twice . Ivanov acted on Putin ’ s order . I was proposed to do any business but not to meddle with politics or mass media. And I have made only one condition: give us Nikolay back.

  (How do you like this trade, comrades and gentlemen readers? Do you want Sergey Ivanov, merchant of living merchandise, to become Putin’s successor?)

  – So how did the power formulate the conditions?

  – That we sell the media empire and Berezovsky stops his political activities.

  – All of your media or only e-media? The journalist asks.

  – No, all of them including the newspapers. And Kommersant too.

  – But if you had answered a categorical “no” it would have meant the end of negotiations about Glushkov’s fate.

  – Exactly . But I didn’t say “no”. …

  – So you left Sergey Ivanov’s office with some arrangement?

  – The arrangement consisted of them telling us whom we should talk to before March 25th.

  They did. First they gave the name of Alekperov. “We had to agree with Alekperov about the selling of all of our media.” When Berezovsky and Patarkatzishvili did not succeed to agree about acceptable conditions for transferring their business they were hurried. On April 11th (on April 9th I arrived to Lefortovo) 2001 the FSB organized a provocation with an “escape attempt” by Glushkov from the hospital where he was just transferred under the guard of the FSB. (“Glushkov has a hereditary blood disease and he can die without a regular treatment,” Patarkatzishvili said.) “Any talks about Glushkov’s escape and the preparation to it are just a stupid FSB special operation related to the crumbling Aeroflot affair and the power’s maniacal desire to stop Berezovsky’s political activities.”

  In the end Berezovsky was forced to sell his 49%-share holding of ORT to whom? -… To Putin’s close oligarch Roman Abramovich for an insignificant amount. Today Berezovsky filed a suit against Abramovich. “According to him Roman Abramovich forced him to sell his assets at a low price,” Vedomosti writes on 05.07.05 and cites Berezovsky: “It wasn’t a sale, it was a racket organized by Putin, Abramovich and the former head of the president’s administration Voloshin”, Berezovsky said.

  For people who want to know where do negotiations about the fate of State hostages take place: here is what Patarkatzishvili said to the question “Where did your meetings with Ivanov take place? In the governmental residence on Kosigina, 34. On March 2nd and 13th 2001. Very confidentially. I was brought there by car.”

  In November 2000 Berezovsky left Russia and now lives in Great Britain. As soon as ORT was taken away from him a campaign was started to take away the TV-6 channel from him. Mister Alekperov was put at work again. In Fall 2001 V. Alekperov’s Lukoyl obtained a court decision about the liquidation of TV-6 through his filial Lukoyl-Garant (junior partner of TV-6). In the beginning of January 2002 TV-6’s appeal of the court’s decision was rejected by the presidium of the Appeal Court despite the fact that the law, on which the decision was based, became invalid from January 1st 2002.

  On January 15th 2002 president Putin announced that the State would not intervene in the situation around TV-6. In the night of January 21st 2002 TV-6 stopped broadcasting. On January 29th 2002 Putin gave the government an order to work out the question of creating a national sport channel in Russia. However on March 27th 2002 the channel was given to the non-commercial partner Mediasocium headed by Evgeny Primakov and Arkady Volsky, in which E. Kiselev’s team was the junior partner. Actually the “victory” was only momentary. A few months later broadcasting on TV-6 was stopped and a sport channel started to broadcast from the TV-6 frequency.

  In this chapter I have told only in general traits how the largest television channels were taken away in order to make them Kremlin’s property and Putin’s mouthpieces. Apart from this in the last years the Kremlin expropriated less significant channels, radio stations and hundreds of newspapers and journals.

  THE STAFF OF THE RULING REGIME

  (THE PRESIDENT’S ADMINISTRATION)

  The RF president’s administration possesses huge informal powers although its legal status is not written in any laws. This is how the director of the Institute of problems linked with liberal development Yuly Nisnevich defined the role of the president’s administration in an interview to Kommersant: “His administration is mentioned only in the Constitution and is not defined by other laws. Politically it is the staff of the ruling regime, which uses the power resource of other official bodies of power in its interests.” But in essence the Administration is not even second after Fradkov’s government but the first and the main government. The media name 43 people among the leaders of the Administration. The Administration is situated in large buildings on Ilyinka Street and on the Old Square. The total number of the Administration’s employees is obviously several thousand people.

  From the 43 leaders of the Administration, the highest in the hierarchy is Dmitry Medvedev. This chapter was already written when rearrangements have followed. Medvedev was just transferred to the post of the government’s deputy prime minister. Former governor of the Tyumen region Sergey Sobyanin was appointed head of Administration. Still this rearrangement did not modify the essence of the Administration. He is 40 years old; he is the son of a Leningrad’s professor. He graduated from the juridical faculty of the Leningrad’s State University in 1987, and then he finished his post-graduate studies in the faculty. But his main quality is that he is Putin’s long time friend. In his biography in the Kommersant-Power newspaper it is said: “From 1990 he becomes the assistant of Lensovet’s chairman Anatoly Sobchak (he postulated for the post on an invitation of Sobchak’s advisor Vladimir Putin)”. He owns his further successes and the growth of his career to Putin’s advancement into power. Together with him he moves to Moscow. From August 31st 1999 he becomes deputy head of the president’s Administration Alexander Voloshin. It is interesting to note that in the year of Putin’s appointment on the post of FSB director in 1998, Putin and his group start to lay their hands on the financial power as well. In 1998 Medvedev is elected only as member of the Directors’ Board of the “Fraternal timber industrial complex” joint-stock company. We can only guess at how it was achieved. Maybe they hinted on the FSB powers (unlimited) and proposed the timber industrials to move aside. Actually in 1998 Vladimir Vladimirovich was certainly already an artist in the sphere of property theft. They asked the timber industrials to move aside. Unlimited opportunities opened up before Putin’s group after he became president. He became president on March 26th and on June 3rd 2000 Medvedev, Putin’s faithful companion, became first deputy of the Administration’s head (Yeltsin left Voloshin to Putin; it was impossible yet to remove him) and on June 30th Putin’s group is already taking over, not some fraternal timber industrials, oh no, Medvedev becomes chairman of Gazprom’s Board of Directors. Naturally, conserving his post of head of administration. If we remember that Alexey Miller (from 1991 he was member of the Committee of Saint Petersburg’s city hall’s external relations) becomes Gazprom’s general director almost at the same time, then these two appointments are called “Gazprom’s takeover” by Putin’s group.

  It would be simpler to start the biographies of the “leaders” of the president’s Administration from the year when each of them met Putin. Igor Ivanovich Sechin is believed to be a very powerful man in the Administration. He is 45 years old. He graduated from the philological faculty of Leningrad’s State University specialized as “philologist-novelist, teacher of French and Portugal”. He worked as a translator in Mozambique and Angola. “According to the media, he
worked for the KGB in Africa,” Kommersant-Power affirms for example. In Sobchak’s city hall “he was responsible for contacts with Leningrad’s cities-friends: Rio de Janeiro, Barcelona and Milan.” He met Putin during a trip of Lensovet’s delegation to Brazil in 1990. From this time he accompanies him in all of his trips. When Putin, for example, became FSB director, Sechin was his adviser. On December 31st 1999 he was appointed deputy head of the president’s Administration. From July 27th 2004 he heads Rosneft’s board of directors. In other words, as we see, the president’s administration is slowly but inevitably laying its hands on the property of huge companies. As deputy head of the administration Sechin is responsible for: the Department of external policy, the Department of informational and documental provision and the presidnet’s Office. A layperson is not able to understand, for instance, the difference between the Office and the Department of informational and, for that matter, documental provision. But believe my word, Igor Sechin is almost the most powerful man in our country after Putin. They say that he grants access to Putin. Recently Sergey Dorenko published an anti-utopia, a book called “2008”; Igor Sechin is portrayed there as diabolically sly and cynical. Externally this is a man with an oval, flabby face without a clearly defined shin.

  Rumor has it that Igor Sechin is in a harsh competition with another administration’s deputy head, Vladislav Yurievich Surkov. One department is directly under his orders. But this is the Department of internal policy; therefore Vladislav Yurievich is an extremely important person in the country. He dictates the internal policy: with his hands he created fake nonexisting parties, broke apart existing ones, destroyed the political freedoms in the country and politics as such. If Putin’s group was honest in its unscrupulousness Vladislav Yurievich could have proudly renamed his direction into “Zubatov’s ministry of intrigues and falsification”. We will linger on V.Y.’s activities more in detail later but now shortly about his biography. He was born in 1961 in the village of Solntzevo of the Lipetsk region. The joy of patriots-nationalists is premature here because despite his rural, supposedly Russian coordinates Vladislav Yurievich’s father is a pureblooded Chechen, which is instantly apparent when we look at Surkov. Surkov’s father is Aslambek Dudayev. He was born in the village of Duba-Yurt, where his mother, a 23-years-old graduate of Tambov’s pedagogical institute, arrived to work as a teacher in 1959. She liked her colleague, the teacher Andarbek Dudayev. Vladimir Surkov came to the world in Shalinsky hospital (how was he registered as born in Solntzevo?), until 1967 he lived with his parents in Duba-Yurta and in 1967 the family moved to Grozny, to the oil industry workers’ district, Berezka, Pugachev Street.

  All this information can be obtained in the Zhizn newspaper dated as of 07.13.05. I am not at all disturbed by the fact that Surkov is a Chechen, I am even glad. Because it explains some of his actions by a split personality. Naturally it is surprising that during the second Chechen war politics in Russia were formulated in significant part by a man with a spilt consciousness. How does he live, the poor, since there are rivers of blood between the Surkovs and the Dudayevs? Well, actually, the famous general Ermolov, the conqueror of the Caucasus hated by the Chechens, was married to a Chechen and his four sons later served in the Russian army…

  Vladislav Yurievich Surkov is the figure closest to the NBP; he chose to be our opponent; the organization Nashi was his project; there is a chapter dedicated to it in this book, so I will talk about Surkov more in detail. This is how he is characterized in the reference book “The President’s Administration” (published by the Center of Political Information Nevsky-Lubyanka-Kremlin): “Former representative of the “Family”, joined a strategic alliance with “Piter’s group”, oriented on V. Putin and Alpha-groups; assists the president in issues of internal policy; manages public organizations, regions and media; administers the funds of the president’s administration, signs civil contracts.” In other words Surkov is our “manager”, in the language of the special services he is an officer who watches us, keeps us under his control, represses us. At the same time Surkov is the chairman of the board of directors of Transneft-Product; the cost of the company is 428 million dollars; its sphere of activity is: the transportation of oil products, the construction of pipelines.

  Since Surkov is the former representative of the Family, although he was entrusted with internal policy, he got the poorest company. The wealthiest one is Gazprom and it went to Putin’s faithful veterans: Dmitry Medvedev and Alexey Miller. Gazprom has just bought Sibneft to Roman Abramovich; together their assets are evaluated at 43,1 billion dollars. The president’s next best friend, his veteran Igor Ivanovich Sechin serves, I already told, as chairman of Rosneft’s board of directors. This company extracts, processes and sells oil. Its capital is more modest: 5,3 billion dollars. Another administration’s employee close to Putin is Viktor Petrovich Ivanov, born in 1950; in 1977 he graduated from KGB’s higher courses. He went in reserve in 1994. In 1994-96 he headed the Department of administrative bodies of Saint Petersburg’s city hall.

  He left the city hall with Putin and when the latter became FSB director Viktor Ivanov became head of the FSB department of personal security. Such a post is not entrusted to anybody, only to the salt of the Earth. From January 2000 he is deputy director of the administration. By Ivanov’s initiative in 2002 the president’s amnesty commission was liquidated. As the president’s adviser Viktor Ivanov manages simultaneously two departments: the department of State service issues and the Department of staff issues and State honors. From 2002 Viktor Ivanov becomes chairman of the board of directors of Aeroflot and Almaz-Antey, costing 3,3, billion dollars. The sphere of activity of his companies: air transportation, production of anti-aircraft means. Putin has met Ivanov even before his service in the city hall, they both served in Leningrad’s FSB department. Strange things happen around Ivanov, like around any functionary of the administration. This book is not about Viktor Ivanov but in order for the reader to have a sense of the climate around these people, here is only one story. “On June 6th 2003 Igor Klimov, general director of the Almaz-Antey concern, supposedly a man from the service of foreign intelligence, former Ivanov’s assistant representing his interests in the Almaz-Altey concern, was shot in Moscow. Not long before the murder the Prosecutor General started an investigation about the theft of a huge amount of money (about $ten million) on the account of providing TOP-M1 missile complexes to Greece. They said that Klimov possessed information on this case and a few months earlier the concern’s financier Sergey Vorobiev disappeared with the money,” Izvestia wrote on 06.06.03.

  On March 25th 2004 Viktor Ivanov became less powerful in the administration, since from deputy head of the administration he was appointed president’s assistant. According to some V. Ivanov started to head a serious opposition (inside the PA) to Voloshin-Surkov group and although later Voloshin left the PA himself, Surkov’s group prevailed.

  Igor Ivanovich Shuvalov is considered to be very promising in the administration; he keeps increasing his power. Here is how the Center of Political Information Nevsky-Lubyanka-Kremlin characterizes him: “Former Kasyanov’s friend; oriented on V. Putin, provides the president on issues of “all-national projects”, manages the execution of the messages of the federal Council’s president, the Expert department and the commissions on issues of federative relations and local self-government.” Shuvalov was born in 1967. In 1992 he graduated from the juridical faculty of Moscow’s State University specialized as jurist. Shuvalov has the perfect career of a bureaucrat and a financier, but we do not need its stages. He is a professional, so to speak, “member of the board of directors”. In 1999, for example, he was part of Gazprom’s and in the Russian Development Bank’s board of directors. Now he is doing a quite ungrateful work on his post – he “doubles the GDP” and is responsible for social transformations. They affirm that now Shuvalov “has grown out” of his old contacts and apparently has joined the new “Piter” team. “Sources note, The President’s Samurais (M
oscow, 2005, A. Mukhin) writes, in particular Shuvalov’s successes in fixing the work of the government’s apparatus. For example they say that he led a successful re-attestation among the employees, which resulted in the majority of the pensioners losing their job. Also Shuvalov managed to fix the system of document circulation, which did not work well before him. In particular each Monday he holds consultations about legislative activities, which contributed to the normalization of the system of documents’ passing.” Igor Ivanovich Shuvalov’s heroic deeds on the front of document circulation are naturally impressive, but more impressive is the financial size of the companies, which Shuvalov controls as member of the board of directors. This is Sovkomflot (sea transportation, including transportation of liquefied natural gas and oil products) and Russian Railways (freight and passenger railway transportation). The total weight of these companies is 31,4 billion dollars.

  The president’s assistant Sergey Edwardovich Prikhodko was born in 1957; in 1980 he graduated from Moscow’s State University of International Relations. Until 1997 he made a good career in the Ministry of Interior. Now he is the president’s adviser on issues of external policy and international relations. Besides he is chairman of the board of directors of the TVEL Corporation; the corporation produces nuclear fuel for the reactors of nuclear plants. TVEL’s value is estimated at 1,1 billion dollars. I cannot say for sure what is the estimated value of the Tactical Rocket Weapons Corporation, whose board of directors is also presided by this man with multiple chins; I did not find it in reference books or in the media.

  I have named here only six of the 43 most famous leaders of the president’s administration. But the thirty-seven that are left are not fools either. The president’s administrators are politically powerful people – they manipulate the federation Council, the State Duma, the State Duma elections and the appointment to the Federation Council (Sochin and Surkov); they appoint and (more rarely) dismiss ministers. They are like the overseers of the government and therefore there are above it. At the same time the leaders of the president’s administration are in essence new oligarchs. Therefore the nazbols are a thousand times right when they go out on meetings with the slogan “The oligarchs are in the Kremlin!” They are in the Kremlin and on Old Square. Thus, the president’s administration is a concentration of political and financial power in the country. Even those six that I mentioned: D. Medvedev, I. Sechin, V. Surkov, V. Ivanov, I. Shuvalov and S. Prikhodko control directly or indirectly a major part of the main financial flows in the country; these flows are comparable with half of Russia’s annual budget. You should realize that the post of chairman of the board of directors (or member of the board) of the largest State Company is not ceremonial; this is a real financial power; in many cases it is a monopolistic power.